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Abstract
A distortion-type risk measure is constructed, which evaluates the
risk of any uncertain position in the context of a portfolio that contains
that position and a fixed background risk. The risk measure can also
be used to assess the performance of individual risks within a portfo-
lio, allowing for the portfolio’s re-balancing, an area where standard
capital allocation methods fail. It is shown that the properties of the
risk measure depart from those of coherent distortion measures. In
particular, it is shown that the presence of background risk makes risk
measurement sensitive to the scale and aggregation of risk. The case
of risks following elliptical distributions is examined in more detail and
precise characterisations of the risk measure’s aggregation properties
are obtained.
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1 Introduction
Risk measures are used in order to determine the risk capital that the holder
of a portfolio of assets and liabilities has to hold, that is, to invest with low
risk. Risk measures are closely related to insurance premium calculation
principles, which are studied extensively by Goovaerts et al. (1984). Recent
approaches to risk measures include the one by Artzner et al. (1999) who
introduced a set of axioms on risk measures and introduced the term coherent
measures of risk for risk measures that satisfy those axioms. Distortion risk
measures which satisfy these axioms have been introduced in an insurance
pricing context by Denneberg (1990) and Wang (1996), and in a finance
setting by Acerbi (2002). These are often called distortion risk measures
and are calculated as the expected loss of a portfolio, under an non-linear
transformation of its cumulative probability distribution.
Given the aggregate risk capital of a portfolio, a separate problem that
emerges is the allocation of the total amount of risk capital to the instru-
ments (or sub-portfolios) that the portfolio consists of. The term capital al-
location does generally not imply that actual amounts of capital are moved
between portfolios; it rather signifies a notional exercise used primarily to
evaluate the performance of risks within a portfolio. Capital allocation meth-
ods drawing on cooperative game theory were proposed by Denault (2001),
based on the premise that no disincentives for the pooling of portfolios should
be created by the allocation.
When a distortion risk measure is used for determining the aggregate
capital corresponding to the portfolio, explicit capital allocation formulas
have been obtained by Tsanakas and Barnett (2003) and Tsanakas (2004).
The capital allocation mechanism obtained in the above papers can be
viewed as an internal system of prices defined on the set of risks that form
the aggregate portfolio. The capital allocated to a particular risk, or its
price, is influenced on the dependency between that risk and the aggregate
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portfolio.
If the aggregate portfolio is fixed this approach presents a consistent
method for the allocation of risk capital. However, if the portfolio is not
fixed, and capital allocation is viewed as a decision tool for its re-balancing,
then an inconsistency arises. Allocated capital reflects the dependence be-
tween a risk and the portfolio which contains that risk. Hence when the
weight of that risk in the portfolio changes, the portfolio as a whole is
affected. Therefore, the system of internal prices derived for the static port-
folio changes and is no more valid for assessing the performance of each
individual risk in the re-balanced portfolio.
A related situation arises when the portfolio holder is also exposed to an
element of background risk. This means that besides the specific portfolio
obtained in the financial and insurance markets, the holder is also exposed
to a risk that he cannot (or will not) trade, control or mitigate. Examples
of background risk are the risk to human capital for a firm, unhedgeable
portfolios in an incomplete financial market and insurance risk for which
no reinsurance is typically available e.g. infinite layers. Hence, the risk
measurement of any other risk in the portfolio has always to be evaluated
with reference to the background risk that the holder is exposed to.
While the effect of background risk on risk measurement is not well de-
veloped in the literature, its effect on risk aversion and asset allocation has
been extensively studied in the economics literature. For example, Heaton
and Lucas (2000) deal with portfolio choice in the presence of background
risk, while Gollier and Pratt (1996) seek to characterise utility functions
such that the exposure to an independent background risk increases risk
aversion with respect to any other independent risk. In this paper a dif-
ferent approach is taken. It is proposed that the risk corresponding to a
particular position or instrument is quantified via its risk contribution to a
portfolio that contains itself and the background risk. That risk contribu-
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tion can be determined using standard capital allocation methods. The risk
contribution’s sensitivity to the exposure to background risk can then be
used to characterise the change in preferences that background risk induces.
No assumptions on independence of risks are made.
Following that reasoning, a new distortion risk measure is defined, which
provides a measure of risk for any position X, with reference to a fixed
risk Y that is in the same portfolio as X. This can be interpreted either
as capturing the dynamics of capital allocation under changing portfolio
weights or as quantifying risk X in the presence of a background risk Y .
This is akin to the portfolio holder’s having a system of reference were the
origin has been moved from 0 to Y . This ‘new origin’ is now of course a
random quantity and the risk measure of X relative to Y proposed here
reflects this change.
By studying the properties of that risk measure, it is possible to capture
the impact of background risk on preferences, given that these preferences
are captured by a distortion risk measure. It is shown that background
risk increases agents’ sensitivity to the aggregation of risk; while a coherent
distortion risk measure is positive homogenous and subadditive, background
risk potentially induces superlinearity and superadditivity. This is a notable
departure from the properties of coherent risk measures, which have been
criticised by some authors (e.g. Dhaene et al., 2003) for their insensitivity
to the aggregation of risk. Increased sensitivity to risk aggregation in the
context of the paper makes practical and intuitive sense; in an illiquid envi-
ronment, such as an insurance market, a risk taker will generally require a
higher price at the margin for risk that he is already highly exposed to.
In the case of general probability distributions and dependence struc-
tures, the aggregation properties of risk measurement in the presence of
background risk are difficult to characterise exactly. Therefore, the special
case of joint-elliptically distributed risks is examined. Elliptical distributions
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have become an important tool in financial risk management, because they
combine heavy tails and tail-dependence with tractable aggregation proper-
ties (Embrechts et al, 2002). It is shown that in the presence of background
risk, the risk measure introduced here satisfies a super-linearity property
which manifests sensitivity to the exposure to ‘large’ risks. Moreover, it is
shown that the risk measure is superadditive for comonotonic risks, which
means that the pooling of perfectly correlated positions is penalised. Fi-
nally it is shown that, under some conditions (ensuring that the background
risk does not operate as a hedge) the risk measure penalises increases in
the variability of liabilities, as well as increases in the correlation between
instruments within a portfolio.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 capital allocation
with distortion risk measures is introduced. In Section 3 distortion risk
measures with reference to a background risk are introduced and their basic
properties discussed. Section 4 discusses elliptical distributions and proceeds
with the characterisation of the risk measure’s aggregation properties in an
elliptical environment. Conclusions are summarised in Section 5.
2 Capital allocation with distortion risk measures
Consider a set of random variables X representing insurance and financial
risks, defined on a probability space (Ω,F , P). When X ∈ X assumes a
positive value it is considered a loss. A risk measure ρ is defined as a
real-valued functional on the set of risks, ρ : X 7→ R. The quantity ρ(X)
represents the amount of capital that the holder of risk X has to safely
invest, in order to satisfy a regulator. Risk measures have been extensively
studied in actuarial science in the guise of insurance pricing functionals, see
Goovaerts et al. (1984). A more recent influential approach in the financial
field has been the axiomatic definition of ‘coherent measures of risk’ by
Artzner et al. (1999).
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The following distortion risk measure has been proposed by Denneberg
(1990) and Wang (1996):
ρ(X) =
∫ 0
−∞
(
g
(
F¯X(x)
)− 1) dx + ∫ ∞
0
g
(
F¯X(x)
)
dx, (1)
where F¯X(x) = P(X > x) is the decumulative probability distribution of
X under the real-world probability measure P, while g : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] is an
increasing and concave distortion function such that g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
The distortion risk measure can be interpreted as an expected loss under
a non-linear transformation of the probability distribution; observe that if
g(t) = t, then ρ(X) = E[X]. The distortion risk measure (1) satisfies
the coherence axioms of Artzner et al. (1999), while allowing an economic
interpretation as a certainty equivalent under Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of
choice under risk. It is noted that distortion risk measures are essentially
the same the ‘spectral risk measures’ of Acerbi (2002).
Consider the case where g is differentiable on [0, 1] with bounded first
derivative, an assumption that is made throughout the paper. Moreover we
assume that F¯X is continuous. Then integration by parts yields the following
re-writing of the distortion risk measure
ρ(X) = E
[
Xg′
(
F¯X(X)
)]
. (2)
It is noted that (2) can be easily generalised for the case of a finite number
of discontinuities of F¯X , but this is not pursued here. The factor g
′
(
F¯X(X)
)
in the expectation effects a re-weighting of the probability distribution of
X, placing a higher weight on adverse outcomes of X (adverse in the sense
of having a high rank in the set of possible outcomes).
Suppose an economic agent (insurer, bank) holds a portfolio Z ∈ X ,
consisting of a number of instruments X1, X2, . . . , Xn ∈ X such that
Z = X1 + X2 + · · ·+ Xn. (3)
Then the aggregate capital that the agent has to hold is ρ(Z) = E[Z ·
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g′(F¯Z(Z))]. The capital allocation problem consists or determining capi-
tal amounts Ki, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, corresponding to each instrument Xi, i =
1, 2, . . . , n respectively, such that the allocated amounts add up to the ag-
gregate required capital ∑
j
Kj = ρ(Z). (4)
To determine the capital allocation additional criteria to (4) are of course
needed. A criterion originating in cooperative game theory (Aumann and
Shapley (1974), Denault (2002)) is that the allocation should produce no
incentive for any instrument to leave the portfolio. This is formalised by
requiring that the capital allocated to each instrument is lower than its risk
measure
Ki ≤ ρ(Xi), i = 1, 2, . . . , n (5)
We note that this requirement is consistent with the subadditivity property
of coherent measures of risk, which postulates that ρ(X1 + X2) ≤ ρ(X1) +
ρ(X2), that is, there is always a benefit in pooling portfolios. If subadditivity
is accepted as a valid premise for risk management, then ensuring by (5) that
portfolios are not fragmented is also desirable.
A capital allocation method for distortion risk measures, which satis-
fies (4) and (5) has been developed by Tsanakas and Barnett (2003) and
Tsanakas (2004), who obtained the following allocation formula
Ki = E
[
Xig
′
(
F¯Z(Z)
)]
(6)
If we consider the linear functional
pi(X) = E
[
Xg′
(
F¯Z(Z)
)]
, X ∈ X , (7)
it obviously is Ki = pi(Xi). The allocated capital calculated by (6) equals
the expected loss of the instrument Xi, subject to a re-weighting of its prob-
ability distribution (change of probability measure) by g′
(
F¯Z(Z)
)
. Thus
outcomes of Xi which occur when the aggregate portfolio Z performs badly
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are given more weight. In this way the dependence between Xi and Z is
reflected in the capital allocation, as discussed by Tsanakas (2004).
3 Risk measurement and background risk
3.1 Definition
This representation (7) gives a means of evaluating the risk of every instru-
ment X in relation to the portfolio Z. By viewing pi as a linear functional
one implicitly assumes that the random variable Z, that is, the composition
of the aggregate portfolio is fixed. However, this assumption does not take
into account the fact that when we seek to evaluate the risk of an instrument
X relative to a portfolio Z, this instrument actually forms part of the portfo-
lio itself. In this context, when one modifies X, Z is being modified as well.
This is not a problem if the issue at hand is to measure the performance of
the constituent parts of a fixed portfolio. However, if the capital allocation
method is used to evaluate the performance of different instruments relative
to a portfolio, in order to take investment decisions, then the effect on the
total portfolio of changing investment in any instrument X has to be taken
explicitly into account.
Alternatively, consider the situation that Y is a risk that its holder can-
not (or will not) insure or replicate in the insurance and financial markets.
Thus the holder of Y cannot receive protection against this risk – so to
speak, he is stuck with it. We then call Y a background risk for the par-
ticular agent holding it. From the point of view of an agent exposed to
background risk Y , each risk X must be evaluated in relation to Y as it can
only be contemplated in a portfolio that already contains Y . Hence, a risk
measure would have to be defined which depends on a fixed Y but varies in
X. In the context of the previous discussion, this means that the aggregate
portfolio Z = X + Y , with respect to which the risk of X is evaluated, will
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again not be fixed.
The above arguments motivate the following definition:
Definition 1. The distortion measure ρ(X; Y ) of risk X with respect to
background risk Y is defined by:
ρ(X; Y ) = E
[
Xg′
(
F¯X+Y (X + Y )
)]
, (8)
where g : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] with g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1 is increasing, concave,
and differentiable with bounded first derivative.
In the above definition the probability weighting g′
(
F¯X+Y (X + Y )
)
ex-
plicitly depends on X and therefore ρ(X; Y ), unlike pi(X), is not a lin-
ear functional in X. We note that the risk measure ρ(X; Y ) can also
be expressed as the sensitivity of portfolio X + Y to changes in X. Let
r(a) = ρ(aX + Y ). Then
ρ(X; Y ) =
dr(a)
da
∣∣∣∣
a=1
(9)
Remark: The argumentation presented here also applies to other risk
measures that produce capital allocation mechanisms which are represented
as linear functionals. For example, the exponential tilting capital allocation
method proposed by Wang (2002) is defined by
Ki =
E[Xi exp(aZ)]
E[exp(aZ)]
, a > 0. (10)
Similar arguments as above could be used to define a risk measure by
ρ(X; Y ) =
E[X exp(a(X + Y ))]
E[exp(a(X + Y ))]
, a > 0. (11)
The study of such risk measures is outside the scope of this investigation.
3.2 Elements of stochastic orders
Before proceeding to the discussion of the properties of the risk measure
ρ(X; Y ), some results on the stochastic ordering of two-dimensional random
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vectors are presented here, drawing from Dhaene and Goovaerts (1996) and
Mu¨ller and Stoyan (2002).
The stop-loss order on elements of the set of risks X is a natural way
of comparing the riskiness of probability distributions, by comparing the
stop-loss premiums of risks for any given retention:
Definition 2. For random variables X, Y ∈ X , we say that X is smaller
than Y in stop-loss order and write X ≤sl Y , whenever
E[(X − d)+] ≤ E[(Y − d)+], ∀d ∈ (−∞,∞) (12)
Let
d
= signify equality in distribution. Consider risks X1
d
= Y1 and
X2
d
= Y2 with probability distributions F1, F2 respectively. The random
vectors (X1, X2) and (Y1, Y2) are then different only in the way that their
elements depend on each other. The Frechet Space R2(F1, F2) is defined as
the space of two-dimensional random vectors with fixed marginals F1 and
F2. Elements of R2(F1, F2) can be compared in terms of their dependence
structure via the partial concordance order :
Definition 3. Consider the random vectors (X1, X2), (Y1, Y2) ∈ R2(F1, F2),
with joint cumulative distribution functions FX, FY respectively. We say
that (X1, X2) is smaller than (Y1, Y2) in concordance order and write (X1, X2) ≤c
(Y1, Y2), whenever either of the following equivalent conditions holds:
i) FX(x1, x2) ≤ FY(x1, x2) for all x1, x2.
ii) Cov(h1(X1), h2(X2)) ≤ Cov(h1(Y1), h2(Y2)) for all increasing func-
tions h1, h2 such that the covariances exist.
3.3 Properties of the risk measure ρ(·; Y )
It is apparent that the properties of the functional ρ(·; Y ) are going to be
different to the ones of the distortion risk measure ρ(·). One could actually
regard ρ(·; Y ) as a separate class of risk measures ‘parameterised’ by the
10
random variable Y . Then, it is of interest to study the properties of the risk
measure ρ(·; Y ) and the ways in which they differ from those of the standard
distortion risk measure. The change in the risk measures’ properties will
represent the impact of background risk on risk preferences.
Some elementary properties are given by the following result.
Proposition 1. The distortion risk measure in the presence of background
risk defined by (8), where g is differentiable with bounded first derivative and
the random variables referred to have continuous cumulative distributions
function, satisfies the following properties:
i)
ρ(X; Y ) + ρ(Y ; X) = ρ(X + Y ) (13)
ii) If X and Y are comonotonic
ρ(X; Y ) = ρ(X) (14)
iii) If X1, X2 and Y are comonotonic
ρ(X1 + X2; Y ) = ρ(X1; Y ) + ρ(X2; Y ) (15)
iv)
ρ(X; Y ) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Cov (X, g′ (F¯X+Y (X + Y ))) ≥ −E[X] (16)
v)
ρ(X; Y ) ≤ ρ(X) (17)
vi) If X1
d
= X2 and (X1, Y ) ≤c (X2, Y ), then
ρ(X1; Y ) ≤ ρ(X2; Y ) (18)
Proof. Parts i) and iv) are straightforward. For ii) note that for a comono-
tonic pair (X, Y ), it is known that the sum X + Y is also comonotonic to
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X, which implies that we have that F¯X(X) = F¯X+Y (X + Y )(Dheane et al,
2002). This yields
ρ(X; Y ) = E[Xg′(F¯X+Y (X + Y ))] = E[Xg
′(F¯X(X))] = ρ(X). (19)
Part iii) is a direct result of ii). Proof of v) and vi) follows directly from
Proposition 5 in Tsanakas (2004).
Part i) of the result above just states that the risk of portfolio X + Y
can be broken down to the risk assessments of X relative to Y and of Y
relative to X. Part ii) shows that the risk of an instrument X relative to a
background risk Y that is comonotonic to, is equal to the risk of X with no
background risk. This is because pooling comonotonic portfolios produces
no diversification. Part iii) is a special case of ii) concerning the sum of risks
comonotonic to the portfolio Y .
Part iv) gives a condition for the positivity of the risk measure. Roughly
speaking, ρ(X; Y ) is positive given that X has a high enough positive depen-
dence on (an increasing function of) the aggregate X + Y . This means that
ρ(X; Y ) can be negative, even if X ≥ 0. This could happen if X is highly
negatively correlated to X + Y , because then the presence of X actually
reduces the risk, as it reduces the variability of X + Y . This situation can
occur in practice, especially in the trading of derivative portfolios, where
often both increasing and decreasing contracts on underlying securities are
sold.
Part v) reflects the origin of the risk measure in cooperative game theory,
as the risk of X relative to Y is always dominated by the stand-alone risk
of X. This means that the background risk Y always produces sufficient
diversification benefit so as to reduce the risk of X. This is consistent
with the subadditivity property of distortion risk measures; hence potential
criticisms of subadditive risk measures, such as the ones expressed in Dhaene
et al. (2003) also extend to ρ(·; Y ). Finally, vi) shows that if the pair (X2, Y )
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is more concordant than the pair (X1, Y ), then the risk of X2 relative to Y
is higher that the one of X1. The reason is that a high correlation to the
portfolio Y implies less diversification.
Proposition 1 does not address the aggregation properties of the portfolio-
relative risk measures. For coherent distortion risk measures, one has that
the risk measure is insensitive to the size of portfolios, that is the positive
homogeneity property ρ(aX) = aρ(X), a ∈ R+. Furthermore, by the subad-
ditivity property ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ) it is implied that the pooling of
portfolios, regardless of their dependence structure always produces diversi-
fication benefits. These properties do not necessarily carry over to the case
of portfolio-relative distortion risk measures.
This divergence in aggregation behaviour can be observed heuristically.
Observe that for a positive homogenous risk measure the quantity ρ(aX)
a
is
constant. For the portfolio-relative risk measures, it is:
ρ(aX; Y )
a
= E[X] + Cov
(
X, g′
(
F¯aX+Y (aX + Y )
))
(20)
The above expression obviously varies in a, therefore ρ(aX; Y ) is not posi-
tively homogenous. Furthermore, as the weight a becomes higher, portfolio
aX + Y tends to aX. On the other hand varying a does not change the
marginal distribution of g′(F¯aX+Y (aX + Y )). Hence one would expect the
covariance between X and g′(F¯aX+Y (aX +Y )), which is an increasing func-
tion of aX + Y , to grow. This means that distortion risk measures with
respect to background risk will generally be super-linear, in the sense that
increases in the scale of X will tend to also increase ρ(aX;Y )
a
.
Regarding the issue of pooling portfolios, we can write
ρ(X1 + X2; Y ) = E
[
X1g
′
(
F¯X1+X2+Y (X1 + X2 + Y )
)]
+E
[
X2g
′
(
F¯X1+X2+Y (X1 + X2 + Y )
)] (21)
Now ρ(X1 + X2; Y ) would be subadditive if it held true that
E
[
X1g
′
(
F¯X1+X2+Y (X1 + X2 + Y )
)] ≤ E [X1g′ (F¯X1+Y (X1 + Y ))]
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and
E
[
X2g
′
(
F¯X1+X2+Y (X1 + X2 + Y )
)] ≤ E [X2g′ (F¯X2+Y (X2 + Y ))] .
However the above do not necessarily hold true. Specifically, if X1, X2 are
highly correlated it is conceivable that the pair (X1, g
′◦F¯X1+X2+Y (X1+X2+
Y )) is more concordant than the pair (X1, g
′ ◦ F¯X1+Y (X1 + Y )). Therefore,
the possibility arises that the portfolio-relative risk measure becomes super-
additive for certain dependence structures between risks.
For risks with general joint distributions, it is difficult to cast heuristic
arguments, such as the above, in a formal setting. However, for the case
of elliptical probability distributions, which have well known aggregation
properties, a more precise characterisation of the risk measure’s ρ(X; Y )
aggregation properties is possible. Such an investigation is undertaken in
Section 4. First, however, the aggregation and diversification properties of
ρ(X; Y ) are demonstrated via a simple numerical example.
Consider independent standard normal variables X and Y . To illus-
trate sensitivity to scale, we can evaluate the quantity ρ(aX;Y )
a
for differ-
ent values of the portfolio weight a. An exponential distortion function
g(s) = 1−exp(−hs)1−exp(−h) with parameter h = 10 is used. As seen in figure 1, the
quantity ρ(aX;Y )
a
is increasing, which implies a superlinearity that renders
ρ(X; Y ) sensitive to the scale of X. Moreover, as a gets large this effect
is reduced, since the effect of the background risk Y becomes smaller and
ρ(X; Y ) becomes close to the positive homogenous ρ(X).
To examine the sensitivity to risk aggregation of ρ(X1 +X2; Y ), consider
a multivariate standard normal risk profile.

X1
X2
Y

 ∼ N




0
0
0

 ,


1 r 0
r 1 0
0 0 1




The reduction in risk from pooling X1 and X2, with respect to background
risk Y , is given by the diversification benefit 1− ρ(X1+X2;Y )
ρ(X1;Y )+ρ(X2;Y )
. In figure 2,
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the diversification benefit is plotted as a function of the correlation r between
X1, X2. It is seen that the diversification benefit reduces in the correlation.
Moreover, for high enough correlation it actually becomes negative. This
implies that for high levels of correlation between X1, X2, the background
risk Y causes the risk measure ρ(X1 + X2; Y ) to become superadditive,
that is, to display a sensitivity to the aggregation of risks. This is again a
departure from the properties of the coherent distortion risk measure ρ(X).
4 The case of elliptically distributed risks
4.1 Definition and properties of elliptical distributions
Here we briefly introduce the class of elliptical distributions (Kelker (1970),
Fang et al. (1987)). Elliptical distributions can be viewed as generalisa-
tions of the multivariate normal family, which allow for heavier tails and
asymptotic tail dependence. Furthermore, elliptically distributed vectors
are characterised by a covariance structure similar to the one of the multi-
variate normal, thus creating a convenient tool for modelling symmetric risks
and their aggregation properties. The importance of elliptical distributions
in risk management has been highlighted by Embrechts et al. (2002) and
Landsman and Valdez (2003), where an extensive list of elliptical families is
also given.
Let Ψn be a class of functions ψ(t) : [0,∞) 7→ R such that the function
ψ(
∑n
i=1 t
2
i ) is an n−dimensional characteristic function (Fang et al., 1987).
It then follows that Ψn ⊂ Ψn−1 · ·· ⊂ Ψ1.
Definition 4. Consider an n−dimensional random vector X = (X1, X2, ..., Xn)T .
The random vector X has a multivariate elliptical distribution, denoted by
X ∼ En(µ,Σ,ψ), if its characteristic function can be expressed as
ϕX (t) = exp(it
T µ)ψ
(
1
2
tTΣt
)
(22)
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for some column-vector µ, n × n positive-definite matrix Σ, and for some
function ψ(t) ∈ Ψn, which is called the characteristic generator.
Besides the multivariate normal family, obtained by ψ(t) = e−t, ex-
amples of elliptical distributions are the multivariate t, logistic, symmetric
stable, and exponential power families.
A vector X ∼ En(µ,Σ,ψ) does not necessarily have a density. If the
density exists (Fang et al., 1987), it takes form
fX(x) =
cn√|Σ|dn
[
1
2
(x− µ)TΣ−1(x− µ)
]
, (23)
where dn(·) is a function called the density generator and cn is a constant.
Then the notation X ∼ En(µ,Σ,dn) can also be used.
The mean vector and covariance matrix of X do not necessarily exist. It
is can be shown (Landsman and Valdez, 2003) that the conditions∫ ∞
0
d1(x)dx < ∞ and |ψ′(0)| ≤ ∞ (24)
(where d1(x) is the density generator of the univariate marginal) are suffi-
cient for their respective existence. If the mean and covariance exist, then
they are given by
E (X) = µ, Cov (X) = Σ, (25)
subject to suitable normalisation.
An important property of elliptical distributions is that linear trans-
formations of elliptically distributed vectors are also elliptical, with the
same characteristic generator. Specifically, from (22) it follows that if X ∼
En (µ,Σ, ψ), A is a m × n dimensional matrix of rank m ≤ n, and b is an
m dimensional vector, then
AX + b ∼ Em
(
Aµ + b,AΣAT , ψ
)
. (26)
A direct consequence of (26) is that any marginal distribution of X is also
elliptical with the same characteristic generator, that is, if the diagonal ele-
ments of Σ are σ21, σ
2
2, ..., σ
2
n, then for k = 1, 2, ..., n it is Xk ∼ E1
(
µk,σ
2
k, ψ
)
.
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4.2 Distortion risk measures for elliptically distributed risks
In this section we present some result that will prove useful in the sequel,
relating to representations of distortion risk measures and related functionals
in the case of elliptically distributed risks. Consider X ∼ En(µ,Σ,dn) and
function
D(x) = c1
∫ x
0
d1(u)du. (27)
Assuming that the mean vector and covariance matrix of X are finite, denote
D¯(x) = D(∞)−D(x).Consider now the function
fZ∗(z) = D¯
(
1
2
z2
)
. (28)
It is then shown in Landsman and Valdez (2003) that fZ∗(z) is the density
of some standardised (i.e. with zero mean and unit variance) elliptical ran-
dom variable, which does not necessarily come from the same family as X.
Furthermore denote X∗i = µi + σiZ
∗, σi =
√
σii, i = 1, . . . , n. Then the
following result is proved by Landsman (2006).
Theorem 1. Consider X ∼ En(µ,Σ,dn) with finite mean vector and co-
variance matrix and an increasing, differentiable almost everywhere function
h(x) such that E[h′(X∗i )] < ∞, i = 1, . . . , n. Then
E[(Xi − µi)h(Xj)] = Cov(Xi, Xj)E[h′(X∗j )]. (29)
The theorem allows the explicit calculation of the expectation of an
elliptical random variable, weighted by an increasing function of another
elliptical variable in the same family. This makes the result particularly
useful for the explicit calculation of risk measures and capital allocations
which allow such representations, as shown in the result below.
For a more general version of Theorem 1 not requiring finiteness of co-
variances we refer to Landsman (2006). We note that the results obtained
in this and the next section do not necessarily require that the covariance
matrix is finite; the assumption is made to simplify the exposition.
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Theorem 2. Consider X ∼ E2(µ,Σ,d2) with finite mean vector and covari-
ance matrix and function g : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1], which increasing, concave and
differentiable on [0, 1] with bounded first derivative. Then
E[X1g
′(F¯X2(X2))] = E[X1] +
Cov(X1, X2)√
V ar(X2)
· λg = µ1 + σ12
σ2
· λd, (30)
where λg is a positive constant specific to the elliptical family with density
generator d and the function g.
Proof. From Theorem 1 we have:
E[X1g
′(F¯X2(X2))] = E[X1] + E[(X1 −E[X1])g′(F¯X2(X2))]
= Cov(X1, X2)E[h
′(X∗2 )],
(31)
where h(x) = g′(F¯X2(x)) is an increasing function since
h′(x) = −g′′(F¯X2(x))fX2(x) ≥ 0 (32)
and X∗2 = µ2 + σ2Z
∗ as in Theorem 1. Now
E[h′(X∗2 )] = E[h
′(µ2 + σ2Z
∗)]
=
∫∞
−∞
−g′′(F¯2(µ2 + σ2z))fX2(µ2 + σ2z)fZ∗(z)dz.
(33)
Denote by FZ and fZ the standardised cumulative distribution and density
of X2, i.e. the distributions of random variable Z
D
= X1−µ1
σ1
D
= X2−µ2
σ2
. Let
F¯Z(x) = 1− FZ(x). It then is
F¯X2(µ2 + σ2z) = F¯Z(z), fX2(µ2 + σ2z) =
1
σ2
fZ(z). (34)
So
E[h′(X∗2 )] =
∫∞
−∞
−g′′(F¯Z(z)) 1σ2 fZ(z)fZ∗(z)dz
= 1
σ2
· λg = 1√
V ar(X2)
· λg,
(35)
where λg =
∫∞
−∞
−g′′(F¯Z(z)) 1σ2 fZ(z)fZ∗(z)dz > 0, which does not depend
on µ,Σ.
The following corollaries directly follow from Theorem 2.
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Corollary 1. For X ∼ E1(µ, σ,d1) the distortion risk measure of equation
(2) becomes
ρ(X) = µ + λgσ = E[X] + λg
√
V ar(X) (36)
Corollary 2. For (Xi, Z) ∼ E2(µ,Σ,d2) the capital allocation mechanism
of equation (6) becomes
Ki = µi + λg
σXi,Z
σZ
= E[Xi] + λg
Cov(Xi, Z)√
V ar(Z)
(37)
Corollary 3. For (X, Y ) ∼ E2(µ,Σ,d2) the risk measure with respect to
background risk of equation (8)
ρ(X; Y ) = E[X] + λg
Cov(X, X + Y )√
V ar(X + Y )
(38)
It was observed by Embrechts et al.(2002) that for elliptically distributed
risks, Markowitz-style portfolio optimisation with a positive homogenous
risk measure reduces to classic mean-variance optimisation. The corollaries
above go slightly further for the specific case of distortion risk measures,
as they show that the risk measure itself reduces to a ‘standard deviation
principle’ (e.g. Goovaerts et al., 1984) and the marginal capital allocation
to a simple covariance based one.
4.3 Properties of ρ(X; Y ) for elliptical distributions
The aggregation properties of portfolio-relative distortion risk measures were
discussed in Section 3.3 in a rather heuristic manner. If however risks fol-
low elliptical distributions, based on the results of the previous section, the
aggregation properties of the risk measure can be characterised in a more
precise way.
Proposition 2. Let (X, Y ) ∼ E2(µ,Σ, ψ). The quantity
1
a
ρ(aX; Y ), a 6= 0 (39)
is increasing in a.
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Proof. By Corollary 3, we have that
η(a) =
1
a
ρ(aX; Y ) = E[X] + λg
Cov(X, aX + Y )√
V ar(aX + Y )
(40)
Denote by r(X, Y ) the correlation coefficient between X and Y . By differ-
entiating the above expression, it is shown that
η′(a) ≥ 0 ⇔ 1− r(X, Y )2 ≥ 0, (41)
which always holds true.
Recall that for positive homogenous risk measures the quantity 1
a
ρ(aX)
is constant. Thus, the above proposition reveals a form of super-linearity
for ρ(X; Y ) in that 1
a
ρ(aX; Y ) is actually increasing. This shows that in the
presence of background risk, aggregation of risk is penalised. In the next
result the sensitivity of ρ(X; Y ) to aggregation risk is further characterised,
by proving that it is super-additive for comonotonic risks. This means that
the aggregation of highly dependent risks is being discouraged.
Proposition 3. Let (X, Y, Z) ∼ E3(µ,Σ, ψ) such that X, Y are comono-
tonic. Then
ρ(X + Y ; Z) ≥ ρ(X; Z) + ρ(Y ; Z) (42)
Proof. Since (X, Y ) are comonotonic elliptical variables, they are perfectly
correlated. Therefore we can write Y = aX for a > 0 and X = bY for
b = 1/a > 0. It then is
ρ(X + Y ; Z)
= E
[
Xg′
(
F¯X+aX+Z(X + aX + Z)
)]
+ E
[
Y g′
(
F¯bY +X+Z(bY + Y + Z)
)]
= 11+aρ((1 + a)X; Z) +
1
1+bρ((1 + b)Y ; Z).
(43)
Because of Proposition 2 it is
1
1 + a
ρ((1+a)X; Z) ≥ ρ(X; Z) and 1
1 + b
ρ((1+b)Y ; Z) ≥ ρ(Y ; Z), (44)
which yields the required result.
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The following corollary, characterising the sensitivity of the risk measure
ρ(X; Y ) to increases in the direction of its argument X, is an immediate
consequence of Proposition 3.
Corollary 4. Let (X, Y ) ∼ E2(µ,Σ, ψ) and δ > 0. Then
ρ((1 + δ)X; Y ) ≥ ρ(X; Y ) + ρ(δX; Y ) (45)
The sensitivity of ρ(X; Y ) to the variability of X is identified by the next
result.
Proposition 4. Let (X, Y ) ∼ E2(µ,Σ, ψ), such that V ar(X) = σ2X , V ar(Y ) =
σ2Y and Cov(X, Y ) = σXσY r. Then ρ(X; Y ) is increasing in σX , if Cov(X, Y ) ≥
−V ar(X).
Proof. It is
∂
∂σX
ρ(X; Y ) = ∂
∂σX
{
E[X] + λg
Cov(X,X+Y )√
V ar(X+Y )
}
= λg
∂
∂σX
{√
V ar(X)Cov
(
X√
V ar(X)
, X+Y√
V ar(X+Y )
)}
= λgCov
(
X√
V ar(X)
, X+Y√
V ar(X+Y )
)
+
λg
√
V ar(X) ∂
∂σX
Cov
(
X√
V ar(X)
, X+Y√
V ar(X+Y )
)
(46)
It is thus clear that
Cov
(
X√
V ar(X)
,
X + Y√
V ar(X + Y )
)
⇔ Cov(X, Y ) ≥ −V ar(X) ≥ 0 (47)
and
∂
∂σX
Cov
(
X√
V ar(X)
,
X + Y√
V ar(X + Y )
)
≥ 0 (48)
are sufficient conditions for ρ(X; Y ) to be increasing in σX . Direct calcula-
tion of the derivative in (48) shows that it is always greater than zero.
Thus, the risk measure ρ(X; Y ) is increasing in the variance of X, if
Cov(X, Y ) ≥ −V ar(X) ⇐⇒ Cov(X, X+Y ) ≥ 0. It is intuitively appealing
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that an increase in variability should yield an increase in risk. The condition
shows that this property is only guaranteed to hold when the portfolio X is
positively correlated to the aggregate X + Y . The reason that the property
may not hold for some negative values of the correlation between X and Y is
that, under such a scenario, X operates as a hedge for Y and its variability
might be useful for compensating for that of Y .
It is shown in Landsman and Tsanakas (2006) that for elliptical distribu-
tions an ordering of the diagonal elements of Σ (i.e. variances if they exist)
implies stop-loss ordering of the corresponding random variables. This has
the consequence:
Corollary 5. Let (X, Y ) ∼ E2(µ,Σ, ψ), such that Cov(X, Y ) ≥ −V ar(X).
Then ρ(X; Y ) preserves stop-loss order.
Dhaene and Goovaerts (1996) showed that portfolios of random vari-
ables that are highly dependent in the sense of the concordance order, yield
higher stop-loss premia. As in an elliptical environment concordance order
is equivalent to just ordering the correlation coefficients (e.g. Das Gupta et
al. (1972), Abdous et al (2005), Landsman and Tsanakas (2006)), it follows
that a high correlation between elliptical instruments results in a higher risk
for the portfolio. The way this extends in the presence of background risk
is reflected in the following result. The conditions again ensure that there
are no high negative correlations which introduce hedging effects.
Proposition 5. Let (X, Y, Z) ∼ E3(µ,Σ, ψ) and r be the correlation coef-
ficient of (X, Y ). Then ρ(X + Y ; Z) is increasing in r, if Cov(X, Y + Z) ≥
−V ar(Y + Z) and Cov(Y, X + Z) ≥ −V ar(X + Z).
Proof. It is:
∂
∂r
ρ(X + Y ; Z) = λg
∂
∂r
Cov(X + Y, X + Y + Z)√
V ar(X + Y + Z)
(49)
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Sufficient conditions for the above expression to be positive are
∂
∂r
Cov
(
X, X+Y +Z√
V ar(X+Y +Z)
)
≥ 0 and
∂
∂r
Cov
(
Y, X+Y +Z√
V ar(X+Y +Z)
)
≥ 0
(50)
Direct differentiation shows that these conditions are equivalent to
Cov(X, Y + Z) ≥ −V ar(Y + Z) and Cov(Y, X + Z) ≥ −V ar(X + Z) (51)
5 Conclusion
A distortion-type risk measure was introduced that addresses two distinct
but related issues:
• The effect of background risk on the measurement of the risk of indi-
vidual positions.
• The dynamics of capital allocation, when re-balancing of the aggregate
portfolio is considered.
It was shown that this new risk measure is more sensitive to the scale and
aggregation of losses than the usual (coherent) distortion risk measures. This
sensitivity was characterised in detail for the case of elliptical distributions.
Penalising large losses and the aggregation of highly dependent posi-
tions within a portfolio corresponds to practical concerns. For example, in
an illiquid environment, such as an insurance market, a risk taker will be
sensitive to aggregation by generally requiring a higher price ‘at the margin’
for a type risk that he is already heavily exposed to. Moreover, it is often
observed that heterogeneity in the scale of risks within a portfolio reduces
diversification benefits, with larger risks producing what one could call an
‘elephant in the boat effect’.
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Future work could include studying the effect of background risk on non-
coherent risk measures, as well as a re-examination of asset allocation and
pricing in the presence of background risk.
References
Abdous, B., Genest, C. and Rmillard, B. (2005), ‘Dependence properties
of meta-elliptical distributions,’ in Statistical Modelling and Analysis
for Complex Data Problems, eds. P. Duchesne and B. Rmillard, New
York: Springer, pp. 1-15.
Acerbi, C. (2002), ‘Spectral Measures of Risk: a Coherent Representation
of Subjective Risk Aversion’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 26 (7),
1505-1518.
Artzner, P., F. Delbaen, J-M. Eber, and D. Heath (1999), ‘Coherent Mea-
sures of Risk,’ Mathematical Finance, 9 (3), 203-228.
Aumann, R. J., and L. S. Shapley (1974), Values of Non-Atomic Games.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Das Gupta, S., M. L. Eaton, I. Olkin, M. Perlman, L. J. Savage, and
M. Sobel (1972), ‘Inequalities on the probability content of convex
regions for elliptically contoured distributions,’ in Proceedings of the
Sixth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability,
Vol. II: Probability theory, Berkeley: University of California Press,
pp. 241-265.
Denault, M. (2001), ‘Coherent Allocation of Risk Capital,’ Journal of Risk,
4 (1), 1-34.
Denneberg, D. (1990), ‘Distorted Probabilities and Insurance Premiums,’
Methods of Operations Research, 63, 3-5.
25
Dhaene, J., M. Denuit, M. J. Goovaerts, R. Kaas, and D. Vyncke (2002),
‘The Concept of Comonotonicity in Actuarial Science and Finance:
Theory,’ Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 31 (1), 3-33.
Dhaene, J. and M. Goovaerts (1996), ‘Dependency of Risks and Stop-Loss
Order,’ ASTIN Bulletin, 26 (2), 201-212.
Dhaene, J., M. Goovaerts, and R. Kaas (2003), ‘Economic Capital Alloca-
tion Derived from Risk Measures’, North American Actuarial Journal,
7 (2).
Embrechts, P., A. McNeil, and D. Straumann (2002), ‘Correlation and De-
pendence in Risk Management: Properties and Pitfalls’ in Risk Man-
agement: Value at Risk and Beyond, ed. M.A.H. Dempster. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 176-223.
Fang, K.T., S. Kotz, and K.W. Ng (1987), Symmetric Multivariate and
Related Distributions. London: Chapman & Hall.
Gollier, C. and J. W. Pratt (1996), ‘Risk vulnerability and the tempering
effect of background risk,’ Econometrica 64 (5), 1109-1123.
Goovaerts, M.J., F. de Vylder, and J. Haezendonck (1984), Insurance Pre-
miums: Theory and Applications. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Heaton, J. and D. Lucas (2000), ‘Portfolio choice in the presence of back-
ground risk,’ The Economic Journal 110, 1-26.
Kelker, D. (1970) ‘Distribution Theory of Spherical Distributions and Location-
Scale Parameter Generalization,’ Sankhya 32, 419-430.
Landsman, Z. and E. A. Valdez (2003), ‘Tail Conditional Expectations for
Elliptical Distributions,’ North American Actuarial Journal 7 (4).
26
Landsman, Z. and A. Tsanakas (2006), ‘Stochastic ordering of bivariate
elliptical distributions,’ Statistics and Probability Letters 76 (5), 488-
494.
Landsman, Z. (2006), ‘On the generalization of Stein’s Lemma for elliptical
class of distributions,’ Statistics & Probability Letters, 76 (10), 1012-
1016.
Mu¨ller, A. and D. Stoyan (2002), Comparison Methods for Stochastic Mod-
els and Risks, Wiley.
Tsanakas, A. (2004), ‘Dynamic capital allocation with distortion risk mea-
sures,’ Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 35, 223-243.
Tsanakas, A. and C. Barnett (2003), ‘Risk capital allocation and coop-
erative pricing of insurance liabilities,’ Insurance: Mathematics and
Economics, 33 (2), 239-254.
Wang, S. S. (1996), ‘Premium Calculation by Transforming the Premium
Layer Density,’ ASTIN Bulletin, 26 (1), 71-92.
Wang, S. (2002), ‘A Set of New Methods and Tools for Enterprize Risk
Capital Management and Portfolio Optimization,’ 2002 CAS Summer
Forum.
Yaari, M. (1987), ‘The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk,’ Econometrica,
55 (1), 95-115.
27
